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While most of us think of educational affirmative action policies as be-
nefiting traditional victims of discrimination-racial minorities and wom-
en-there is evidence that it has become popular for universities to employ
gender-conscious admissions policies that are designed to give men the ad-
vantage.' Since 1970, women's enrollment in undergraduate universities
has increased at a faster rate than men's, and the trend is expected to contin-
ue through 2015.2 Female enrollment has also experienced a faster increase
than male enrollment in graduate programs. The ratio of female to male
college students went from rough parity in 1980, to 57/43 in 2006, and by
2010 the ratio is expected to be around 60/40.4 These statistics have forced
school administrators to confront the gender imbalance on campus, and de-
cide what, if anything, they are going to do about it.5
One response has been to maintain a gender balance at the school by
admitting men at a higher rate than women through the use of gender-
conscious admissions policies. 6 While these policies do not share the origi-
nal goals of affirmative action,7 they are nonetheless referred to as gender-
based affirmative action to benefit males.8 Just as racial affirmative action
1. See, e.g., Alex Kingsbury, Admittedly Unequal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 25, 2007, at
50, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/edu/articles/070617/25gender.htm; Mark Clayton,
Overview: The Gender Equation, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR, May 22, 2001, at 11, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0522/p11s2.html; David R. Francis, Op-Ed., Gender Bias in Col-
lege Admissions, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, July 24, 2007, at 8, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0724/pO8sOl-comv.html. Throughout this Comment the terms
"college" and "university" will be used interchangeably. Unless otherwise specified, these terms
refer to public institutions of higher education.
2. U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., THE CONDITION OF EDUCATION 2006 36, 125 (2006), available at
http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006071.pdf (projecting undergraduate enrollments).
3. Id. at 37 (explaining trends in graduate and first-professional programs). "Enrollment in
graduate and first-professional programs increased from 1976 to 2004. Female enrollment expe-
rienced a larger increase than male enrollment during this time for both types of programs." Id.
4. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 51.
5. Francis, supra note 1 ("Admissions directors cite several reasons for wanting to keep the
numbers as equal as possible. Balance makes social life easier. It also helps schools attract the best
candidates of both sexes: When the gender balance tilts to a 60-40 ratio, favoring either gender, stu-
dents are less interested in attending.").
6. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 53. However,
[i]t is difficult to gauge how much impact a college's overall desire to maintain a ba-
lanced student body has on the decision to accept or reject any particular applicant.
Schools are often loath to discuss the specifics of their selection process, and they're es-
pecially sensitive when it comes to issues of preferential treatment for one group of stu-
dents at the expense of another.
Id.
7. "Affirmative action" is defined as: "A set of actions designed to eliminate existing and con-
tinuing discrimination, to remedy lingering effects of past discrimination, and to create systems and
procedures to prevent future discrimination." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 64 (8th ed. 2004).
8. See, e.g., Debra Franzese, Comment, The Gender Curve: An Analysis of Colleges' Use of
Affirmative Action Policies to Benefit Male Applicants, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 719 (2007); Scott Jaschik,
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sparked much controversy, "maintaining gender balance by turning down
well-qualified women to make room for men with less impressive qualifica-
tions has some critics crying foul."9 The "use of gender as a tip factor" may
lead women to file lawsuits alleging gender discrimination, 0 but the poten-
tial success of these claims is difficult to predict because this area of the law
is far from clear."
While there has long been heated debate on the issue of affirmative ac-
tion, the focus of the commentary and litigation has been on race-conscious
policies. 12 In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet heard a gender-based
educational affirmative action case to decide whether a gender-conscious
admissions policy utilized by a public university could withstand a constitu-
tional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 13 Thus, there is no established framework for deciding these
cases.
Affirmative Action for Men, INSIDE HIGHER ED., Mar. 27, 2006,
http://insidehighered.com/news/2006/03/27/admit; Sarah Karnasiewicz, The Campus Crusade for
Guys, SALON.COM, Feb. 15, 2006, http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2006/02/ 15/affirmative
action/index np.html. Throughout this Comment the terms "sex" and "gender" will be used inter-
changeably to refer to discrimination based on whether the person is a man or a woman. The terms
"gender-conscious admissions policy" and "gender-based affirmative action" will be used interchan-
geably to refer to university admissions policies that take an applicant's gender into consideration for
preferential treatment.
9. Francis, supra note 1.
10. See Press Release, Am. Ass'n of Univ. Professors, Mark Clayton of the Christian Science
Monitor Receives Award for Excellence in Coverage of Higher Education (June 10, 2002),
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/newsroom/prarchives/2002/HEAward.htm ("It wouldn't surprise me if
one day we see the use of gender as a tip factor in admissions debated in court just as race in admis-
sions is being debated today."); see also Mark Clayton, Admissions Officers Walk a Fine Line in
Gender-Balancing Act, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 22, 2001, at 11, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0522/p11s1.html ("Unlike gender, the use of race as a factor in col-
lege admissions is under heavy legal fire. At least a half-dozen civil rights lawsuits against public
universities or university systems nationwide allege race bias in admissions, according to the Ameri-
can Association of University Professors. Most involve graduate or law-school admissions. But one
case at the University of Michigan charges race bias in undergraduate admissions. Could today's
race cases provide the template for future legal arguments against gender bias? . . . Admissions de-
cisions that discriminate against women may have to become more egregious before many women
start filing lawsuits. Right now, it is still a 'stealth issue,' some say.").
11. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 53 ("The law in this area is decidedly opaque and sometimes
seemingly contradictory.").
12. Jason M. Skaggs, Comment, Justifying Gender-Based Affirmative Action Under United
States v. Virginia's "Exceedingly Persuasive Justification" Standard, 86 CAL. L. REv. 1169, 1169
(1998).
13. Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1169 ("This lack of guidance has resulted in a split among the fed-
eral circuit courts of appeals with regard to the appropriate level of scrutiny to be applied to such
programs.").
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The Court so far has only commented on gender-conscious admissions
in the context of single-sex schools. 14 The Court has heard several race-
based educational affirmative action cases, most recently Grutter v. Bollin-
ger. " Grutter set forth a number of factors that courts should consider when
faced with the question of whether a university's race-conscious admissions
policy is constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause. 16 Because the
classification in Grutter was based on race, the Court applied strict scrutiny,
which has been the traditional standard of review for racial classifications.17
Gender classifications traditionally have only merited an intermediate stan-
dard of review. Assuming the Court will eventually hear a challenge to a
gender-conscious admissions policy, one question that arises is whether the
Court should apply strict scrutiny, keeping in line with the standard applied
in all race-based educational affirmative action cases, or whether the Court
should apply the lower intermediate scrutiny standard, because the classifi-
cation is based on gender rather than race. Regardless of the level of scruti-
ny applied, the Grutter factors may provide a helpful framework for deter-
mining the constitutionality of a gender-conscious admissions policy.
Part II of this Comment provides an overview of the potential causes of
action available to a party who wishes to challenge a university's gender-
conscious admissions policy.1 9 This part also traces the evolution of the
standard of judicial review for equal protection claims, provides a brief his-
tory of Supreme Court cases involving equal protection challenges to educa-
tional affirmative action policies, and reviews the current practice of gender-
based affirmative action in the context of higher education.2 0 Part III dis-
cusses the various views on the appropriate standard of judicial review for
the Court to apply when evaluating a challenged gender-conscious admis-
sions policy. 2 1 Part IV begins by asserting that the standard of scrutiny
should be the same whether the gender-conscious policy is benefiting or
burdening males or females.22 Part IV then suggests that the use of the
Grutter factors may provide a helpful framework for the Court in deciding a
future gender-based affirmative action case, as well as a helpful guide to
14. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (all-male military school); Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (all-female nursing school).
15. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
16. See id.; Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 2004) (deriving five factors
from the Grutter opinion).
17. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326.
18. See infra notes 46-64, 92-101 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 25-33 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 34-119 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 120-42 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 143-55 and accompanying text.
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universities in formulating a constitutional admissions policy. 23 Part V con-
cludes this Comment.24
II. EDUCATIONAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Potential Causes ofAction for Claims of Gender-Based Discrimination
A woman who believes she has been wrongly discriminated against as a
result of a university's gender-conscious admissions policy has several poss-
ible causes of action. One option is to challenge the constitutionality of the
admissions policy under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 25  Another option is to chal-
lenge the legality of the admissions policy under Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972.26 Additionally, she may challenge a discriminatory
23. See infra notes 156-95 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 196-98 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 29-33 and accompanying text.
26. Jaschik, supra note 8 ("Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 bars gender discrimi-
nation in all education programs at institutions receiving federal funds (all but a handful of colleg-
es)."); see also Franzese, supra note 8, at 728-29 (reviewing affirmative action policies under Title
IX). Title IX provides that "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educa-
tion program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance . . . ." 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1994).
Therefore, the plain language of Title IX effectively prohibits a college from considering an appli-
cant's gender in the admissions process. Jaschik, supra note 8 ("The Education Department's Office
for Civil Rights[,] . . . charged with enforcing Title IX, . . . said[] regulations 'prohibit treating indi-
viduals differently on the basis of sex, including giving preferences on the basis of sex."'). Howev-
er, there is an important exemption to Title IX. The statute covers all graduate and professional pro-
grams, but it only applies to public undergraduate admissions programs. Jaschik, supra note 8; see
also Franzese, supra note 8, at 728-29 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(1) (2000) ("[I]n regard to admis-
sions to educational institutions, this section shall apply only to institutions of vocational education,
professional education, and graduate higher education, and to public institutions of undergraduate
higher education.")). Therefore, private undergraduate institutions are beyond Title IX's reach. As
far as the level of protection Title IX offers students applying to public colleges is concerned, courts
analyze Title IX challenges under the highest standard of judicial review. See Johnson v. Bd. of Re-
gents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1367 (S.D. Ga. 2000). This is not because of
the class being protected, but rather, because courts have interpreted the similarity in language to
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to mean that both statutes require the same level of protec-
tion. Id. ("Except for the substitution of the word 'sex' in Title IX to replace the words 'race, color,
or national origin' in Title VI, the two statutes use identical language to describe the benefited
class.... And 'because Title IX and Title VI use the same language, they should be read to require
the same levels of protection and equality.' Therefore, the standard for finding gender discrimina-
tion under Title IX is the same as Title VI's standard for racial discrimination, which is identical to
the Equal Protection Clause's standard for racial classifications-i.e., strict scrutiny." (quoting Can-
non v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 667, 694-96 (1979); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir.
1994)) (citations omitted)); see also Jeldness, 30 F.3d at 1227-28 ("[Titles IX and VI] should not be
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admissions policy under State Equal Rights Amendments.2 7 This Comment
will focus on Fourteenth Amendment equal protection challenges.28
When a "challenged [admissions] policy expressly discriminates among
applicants on the basis of gender, it is subject to scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." 29 The Equal Protection
Clause prohibits any state from "deny[ing] to any person... the equal pro-
read to require different levels of protection because the Equal Protection Clause is interpreted diffe-
rently for race than for gender. Research has disclosed no opinion holding that Title IX is coexten-
sive with the Equal Protection Clause.").
27. In 1972, the same year Title IX was enacted, a federal constitutional amendment was pro-
posed with the purpose of eliminating all forms of sex discrimination. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitu-
tional Law § 826 (1998). The proposed Federal Equal Rights Amendment read as follows:
Section 1. Equality of rights under the Law shall not be denied or abridged by the United
States or by any state on account of sex.
Section 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.
Section 3. The Amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratification.
JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 845 n.62 (6th ed. 2000). The
Federal Equal Rights Amendment "would have prohibited the denial or abridgement of equal rights
on the basis of sex." 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 826 (1998). The federal amendment
was never adopted because it failed to be ratified by the requisite number of states. Id. However,
nearly half the states have enacted state civil rights legislation, as well as more direct state constitu-
tional and statutory provisions generally known as "Equal Rights Amendments," which explicitly
prohibit sex discrimination. Id. One example is the Minnesota Human Rights Act which provides:
"It is an unfair discriminatory practice to discriminate in any manner in the full utilization of or ben-
efit from any educational institution, or the services rendered thereby to any person because of ...
sex . . . ." Franzese, supra note 8, at 732-33 (quoting MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(1) (2001)). "The sta-
tute further explicitly prohibits sex discrimination in educational institutions' admissions' policies."
Id. at 733. Unlike Title IX, these state amendments often are not limited to regulation of public un-
dergraduate institutions. Id. at 734. The level of protection offered to applicants depends on the
state, and "[c]onstruction of the [E]qual [R]ights [A]mendment has ranged from an absolute or literal
interpretation, through a 'strict' standard interpretation, to what has been called a permissive inter-
pretation." 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 837 (1998); see also 16B C.J.S. Constitutional
Law § 1149 (2005) ("A state may expressly forbid gender-based discrimination by a constitutional
equal rights amendment providing that equality of rights and responsibility under the law may not be
denied or abridged on account of sex. . . . The protections provided by a state equal rights amend-
ment may go beyond those provided by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
of the United States Constitution. Under an equal rights amendment, if equality is restricted or de-
nied on the basis of sex, the classification is discriminatory, and state-sanctioned, sex-based classifi-
cations are suspect. Thus, a statutory classification based on sex may be subject to strict judicial
scrutiny under a state equal rights amendment, in which case the classification will be upheld only if
a compelling interest justifies it and if the impact of the classification is limited as narrowly as poss-
ible consistent with its proper purpose." (footnotes omitted)).
28. Though this Comment focuses on constitutional challenges under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, an equal protection cause of action is not limited to applicants of universities that receive state
funds. An applicant of a university receiving federal funds may bring a challenge under the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Deborah L. Brake, Sex as a Suspect Class: An Argument
for Applying Strict Scrutiny to Gender Discrimination, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 953, 954 n.6
(1996) ("Constitutional challenges to sex discrimination by the United States are brought under the
Fifth Amendment, which applies to the United States, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amendment
Equal Protection Clause, which covers actions by states and their subdivisions. However, the same
legal standards apply to equal protection actions under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.").
29. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) (citing Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71, 75 (1971)).
344
[Vol. 37: 339, 2009] Scrutinize This!
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
tection of the laws."30 The Supreme Court interprets this clause to prohibit
many forms of sex discrimination, including discrimination resulting from
gender-conscious admissions policies. 31 Similar to Title IX, the Fourteenth
Amendment regulates only state action, placing discrimination in private in-
stitutions beyond its reach.3 2  Should an applicant wish to bring an equal
protection claim, the applicant must allege that the university intentionally
discriminated against her by classifying her on the basis of an impermissible
characteristic-gender-for different treatment from similarly situated indi-
viduals. 3
B. The Evolution of the Standard of Judicial Review for Equal Protection
Claims
Depending on the nature of the challenge under the Equal Protection
Clause, the Supreme Court reviews the claims with a varying amount of de-
ference to state legislators and other state actors, from allowing a large
amount of discretion, to conducting a "searching review" of the challenged
policy. 34 Whether an allegedly discriminatory admissions policy will with-
stand an equal protection challenge depends on the purpose attributed to the
gender classification and the degree to which the classification is related to
the asserted purpose. 35 Thus, the determination as to whether a policy meets
the equal protection guarantee largely depends upon the standard of review
applied by the Court.36 This section will trace the evolution of the standard
of judicial review, focusing on the standard typically applied with respect to
gender classifications.
30. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("No state shall ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.").
31. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 826 (1998).
32. Franzese, supra note 8, at 723. While most colleges-including private universities-in the
United States receive some sort of government funding, see Jaschik, supra note 8, the mere receipt
of public funding does not create a state actor for purposes of alleging a constitutional violation. 2
RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.4(c) (3d ed.
1999).
33. 3 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 32, § 18.2. "In applying [the Equal Protection] [Cllause,
[the Supreme] Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to
States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways." Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71,
75 (1971). "The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the pow-
er to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes
on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute." Id. at 75-76.
34. Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1172 ("Equal Protection challenges can trigger different degrees of
judicial scrutiny depending upon the nature of the statutory classification at issue.").
35. See NOwAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 638.
36. See id.
345
1. The Traditional Two Tiers: Rational Basis and Strict Scrutiny
Traditionally, when the Court reviewed a claim brought under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment it had a two-tiered ap-
proach to judicial review: either it applied the "rational basis" or "strict scru-
tiny" standard. 7 The level ofjudicial review applied by a court significantly
impacts the outcome of the case, because "[c]ourts rarely have sustained leg-
islation subjected to the 'strict scrutiny' standard of review, while few sta-
tutes have failed to satisfy the traditional equal protection test of rationali-
ty."" Strict scrutiny is the highest level of scrutiny, and it is applied when a
party complains that a law or policy impinges upon a "fundamental right" or
complains of discrimination based on a "suspect classification."39 The clas-
sifications most commonly held to be "suspect" are those based on race,
alienage, or national origin.40
37. "The reason for the difference in treatment ... stems from Justice Stone's reference to the
existence of an important judicial function in protecting certain fundamental constitutional rights and
'discrete and insular minorities."' 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.3(a) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("There may be narrower scope for
operation of the presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a
specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed
equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. . . . It is unnecessary to consider
now whether legislation which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to
bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny
under the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of legislation
.... Nor need we enquire ... whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a
special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinari-
ly to be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching
judicial inquiry . . . ." (alterations in original))).
38. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 817 (1998). This is because under strict scrutiny
there is a presumption that the law is unconstitutional, whereas with rational basis review there is a
presumption of constitutionality. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 314 (1993).
39. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 812 (1998). Examples of fundamental rights are:
"marriage and procreation, voting, and the right to travel." 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1118
(2005).
40. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.3. "It is well established that when the govem-
ment distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of individual racial classifications, that action is
reviewed under strict scrutiny." Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S.
Ct. 2738, 2751 (2007) (citing Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306 (2003); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995)). "As the Court recently
affirmed, 'racial classifications are simply too pernicious to permit any but the most exact connec-
tion between justification and classification."' Id. at 2752 (citations omitted). Indeed, the Court has
held that "[r]acial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and thus call for the most
exacting judicial examination." Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978);
see 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 817 (1998) ("In determining whether a class is [inherent-
ly] suspect, and thus is entitled to have applied to it the strict scrutiny test, a court traditionally looks
for an indication that the class is saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history of pur-
poseful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a position of political powerlessness, as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process. The underlying rational of the 'sus-
pect classification' theory is that where legislation affects discrete and insular minorities, the pre-
sumption of constitutionality fades because traditional political processes may have broken down.").
346
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To survive strict scrutiny, a race-conscious admissions policy must be
"narrowly tailored" to further a "compelling governmental interest." 4 1 Strict
scrutiny is applied to suspect classifications "to 'smoke out' illegitimate
uses" of the classification in order to assure that the policy-maker "is pur-
suing a goal important enough to warrant use of a highly suspect tool." 42 At
the other end of the spectrum is the deferential "rational basis" standard,
which requires only that the statute be rationally related to a legitimate go-
vernmental interest. 43  Since the late 1930s, the rational basis standard has
been applied when a party challenges general economic and social classifi-
cations.44
2. The Development of the Intermediate Scrutiny Standard
Historically, gender discrimination was considered on par with econom-
ic classifications, and thus, was reviewed under a rational basis standard.45
Today, however, gender classifications are generally subject to an "interme-
diate" standard of scrutiny.46 To withstand an equal protection challenge
under this standard, "classifications by gender must serve important go-
vernmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of
those objectives."47
41. Parents Involved in Cmnty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2751-52; Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326. Under this
exacting standard, "when governmental decisions 'touch upon an individual's race or ethnic back-
ground, he is entitled to a judicial determination that the burden he is asked to bear on that basis is
precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest."' Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323 (citing
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 299).
42. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326 (citing City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493
(1989)).
43. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.3 ("[T]he Court will ask only whether it is
conceivable that the classification bears a rational relationship to an end of government which is not
prohibited by the Constitution.").
44. See id.
45. See Brake, supra note 28, at 953; 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.3.
46. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976); see also Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53,
75-77 (2001) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (providing an overview and comparison of the differences
between rational basis and heightened scrutiny with regard to gender classifications). Justification
that has been offered to explain the lower standard of review for gender than for race, at least in the
context of university admissions, is that "[g]ender-based distinctions are less likely to create the ana-
lytical and practical problems present in preferential programs premised on racial or ethnic criteria"
because with "gender there are only two possible classifications." Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03. Per-
haps a more controversial justification offered in the same opinion is that "the perception of racial
classifications as inherently odious stems from a lengthy and tragic history that gender-based classi-
fications do not share." Id. at 303. This justification appears to ignore the long history of discrimi-
nation against woman.
47. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197; see also United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996) (quoting
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)).
347
It was not until the 1971 Reed v. Reed decision that the Supreme Court
ratcheted up the level of scrutiny applied to gender discrimination. 48  This
was the first time the Court offered realistic protection against sex discrimi-
nation under the equal protection guarantee, and no longer treated sex classi-
fications as economic classifications. 4 9 Though the Court did not explicitly
adopt heightened scrutiny for gender classifications, the Court clearly ap-
plied "something more stringent than the traditionally lenient rational basis
review. . . ."o After Reed, policies challenged on the basis of gender dis-
crimination would be subjected to a higher level of scrutiny by requiring that
the relationship between the classification and the policy's objective be "fair
and substantial" instead of merely rational.
In 1973, the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson revisited the proper stan-
dard of review and came close to establishing gender classifications as sus-
pect, and, therefore, deserving of strict scrutiny.5 2  Justice Brennan found
48. See Brake, supra note 28, at 954; see also J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 152 (1994)
(Kennedy, J., concurring) ("As illustrated by the necessity for the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920,
much time passed before the Equal Protection Clause was thought to reach beyond the purpose of
prohibiting racial discrimination and to apply as well to discrimination based on sex. In over 20 cas-
es beginning in 1971, however, we have subjected government classifications based on sex to heigh-
tened scrutiny."). A unanimous Court in Reed held that an Idaho statute which preferred males to
females in the administration of estates without regard to individual qualifications violated the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 74 (1971). In the opi-
nion delivered by Chief Justice Burger, the Court stated that "this Court has consistently recognized
that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of per-
sons in different ways." Id. at 75. The opinion went on to state that "[t]he Equal Protection Clause
of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be
accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated
to the objective of that statute." Id. at 75-76. The Court explained that "[a] classification 'must be
reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial
relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike."' Id. at 76.
49. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.22.
50. See Brake, supra note 28, at 954. This tougher rational basis standard applied by the Court in
Reed has been called "rational basis with teeth." See Raffi S. Baroutjian, Note, The Advent of the
Multifactor, Sliding-Scale Standard ofEqual Protection Review: Out with the Traditional Three-Tier
Method ofAnalysis, in with Romer v. Evans, 30 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1277, 1310 (1997) (citing David
0. Stewart, Supreme Court Report: A Growing Equal Protection Clause?, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1985, at
108, 112; Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Note, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other
Name, 62 IND. L.J. 779, 794 (1987)). Instead of applying the "toothless" rational basis review pre-
viously applied to gender classifications, the Court in Reed took a realistic look at the asserted pur-
pose of the classification rather than accepting any conceivable hypothetical purpose. See WILLIAM
COHEN, JONATHAN D. VARAT & VIKRAM AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 710-11 (12th ed. 2005). It
is significant that the Court here invalidated a statute using rational basis review, because statutes are
generally presumed constitutional under the rational basis standard, and are rarely invalidated. See
id
51. Reed, 404 U.S. at 76.
52. See Brake, supra note 28, at 954. In Frontiero, the Court held that the purpose of "adminis-
trative convenience" was unconstitutional where the issue was whether women in uniformed servic-
es could claim their husband as a dependent on equal footing with what the men could claim of their
wife. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 690-91 (1973) (plurality opinion). After considering
the long history of sex discrimination, the fact that sex is an immutable characteristic, and the fact
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implicit support for strict scrutiny in Reed, but only a plurality shared his
view.53 After Frontiero, the Court retreated from a strict scrutiny standard,
and a majority of the Court has not yet held sex to be a suspect class.54
In 1976, in Craig v. Boren, the Court articulated for the first time a
heightened standard of review for gender classifications which came to be
known as middle tier, or intermediate scrutiny." Under intermediate scruti-
ny, a state's "burden is met only by showing at least that the classification
serves 'important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means
employed' are 'substantially related to the achievement of those objec-
tives."' 5 6  Intermediate scrutiny entails far less deference to the legislature
that sex had no relationship to an individual's ability to perform or contribute in this context, a plu-
rality "conclude[d] that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage,
or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."
Id. at 684, 686, 688. A majority of the Court has yet to hold that gender-based classifications are
"inherently suspect." See infra note 55 and accompanying text; see also Ann K. Wooster, Annota-
tion, Equal Protection and Due Process Clause Challenges Based on Sex Discrimination, 178
A.L.R. FED. 25 (2002) ("Unlike the California Supreme Court ... the United States Supreme Court
has not held that gender-based classifications are 'inherently suspect' and thus the Court does not
apply so-called 'strict scrutiny' to those classifications, but the Court has held that the traditional
minimum rationality test takes on a somewhat 'sharper focus' when gender-based classifications are
challenged."). Rather, gender tends to be considered a "quasi-suspect" classification, deserving
more than rational basis standard, but less than strict scrutiny. 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1119
(2005) ("Quasi-suspect classifications are subject to an intermediate level of judicial scrutiny in the
resolution of equal protection challenges."); Baroutjian, supra note 50, at 1292-93 ("Classifications
involving quasi-suspect groups trigger intermediate scrutiny. Quasi-suspect groups are groups that
share some characteristics of a suspect group; yet, because they do not qualify as 'discrete and insu-
lar minorities,' they only receive intermediate review instead of strict scrutiny. Currently, only two
classifications have been accorded intermediate scrutiny: those based on gender and those based on
the legitimacy of children." (footnotes omitted)).
53. See Brake, supra note 28, at 954; see also NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 831 ("Jus-
tice Brennan, in a plurality opinion, stated that sex was a suspect class . . . . However, this view of
sex as a suspect class never gained the support of a majority of Justices voting in a single case.").
54. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 218 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also United States
v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 532 (1996).
55. See Brake, supra note 28, at 955. In Craig v. Boren, the Court reviewed a statute that main-
tained a "gender-based differential" with regard to beer sales. Craig, 429 U.S. at 191-92 (majority
opinion). The Court applied heightened or "intermediate" level scrutiny and determined that the
statute was unconstitutional. Id. at 218 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan announced that
"[t]o withstand constitutional challenge ... classifications by gender must serve important govem-
mental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those objectives." Id. at 197
(majority opinion). "A majority of the Justices now had agreed upon a specific definition for the
intermediate level of review applied in gender discrimination cases." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra
note 27, at 833-34. "Indeed, the Court's agreement on a standard of review was much more impor-
tant than the holding in Craig." Id. at 834. Again, Brennan stated that "administrative ease and
convenience" are not "sufficiently important objectives to justify gender-based classifications."
Craig, 429 U.S. at 198.
56. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (citing Wengler v. Druggists
Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142, 150 (1980)).
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than does rational basis review, but does not require as compelling an inter-
est as does strict scrutiny. 7 Thus, individuals have more constitutional pro-
tection from arbitrary gender classifications than from economic and social
classifications, but less protection than they have from racial discrimination.
The Court had now clarified the proper standard of review for gender-based
classifications, but had not provided lower courts with much guidance on
how to evaluate whether a state's asserted interest is sufficiently "impor-
tant," or whether the classification is "substantially related" to that interest.
Following Craig, the Court has arguably articulated a stronger interme-
diate scrutiny test.59 These later cases may suggest that a state must demon-
strate an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for a gender-based classifica-
tion. 60 Beginning in 1979, this "exceedingly persuasive" language appeared
in at least two cases "to describe the difficulty of demonstrating that the
challenged sex-based classification bore a substantial relationship to an im-
portant state interest." 6 1 In the 1996 United States v. Virginia (VMI) deci-
sion, however, Justice O'Connor used the "exceedingly persuasive justifica-
tion" language in a way that was interpreted by some to be a "substantive
standard in its own right, [which is] somewhat more stringent than the sub-
stantial relationship-important state interest test." 62 Others argue that, in
fact, the exceedingly persuasive standard and the substantially related stan-
dard are the same thing. 63 Regardless of the standard applied, the Court's
method of determining whether a challenged classification has violated the
Equal Protection Clause involves a review of the asserted purpose for the
classification and a review of the relationship between the purpose and the
challenged classification.64
57. 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.3.
58. See Brake, supra note 28, at 955. Examples of what has been found to be an "important go-
vernmental interest": Miami Univ. Wrestling Club v. Miami Univ., 195 F. Supp. 2d 1010, 1015
(S.D. Ohio 2001) (elimination of sex discrimination in publicly funded educational institutions);
Craig, 429 U.S. at 199-200 (public health and safety); Buzzetti v. City of New York, 140 F.3d 134,
142 (2d Cir. 1998) (preventing crime, maintaining property values, and preserving quality of life);
Wengler, 446 U.S. at 151 (providing for needy spouses); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 317
(1977) (providing a reduction in disparity in economic condition between men and women).
59. See Brake, supra note 28, at 957.
60. Id.
61. Deborah L. Brake, Reflections on the VMI Decision, 6 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 35, 38-39
(1997) (citing Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 718).
62. Brake, supra note 61, at 39 ("The Court referred to the test as '[t]oday's skeptical scrutiny'
... suggesting that the burden may in fact be higher."); see also Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1173
("[T]he Court's decisions in Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, JE.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
TB., and United States v. Virginia have transformed this standard into a more demanding inquiry.").
63. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
64. With rational basis review, the Court may not even look for a purpose asserted by the party
defending the classification. Rather, the standard is so deferential that so long as the Court can con-
ceive of any rational basis, the classification will be upheld. See FCC v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508
U.S. 307, 313-14 (1993); supra note 43.
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C. The Supreme Court's Take on Educational Affirmative Action and
Equal Protection
The Equal Protection Clause is likely violated when "laws favor the
members of one class over another, or exclude one class but not another, in
the course of providing educational opportunities for their citizens." 65 How-
ever, in the educational affirmative action context, the Court has held that
"[t]he freedom of a university to make its own judgments as to education in-
cludes the selection of its student body." 66 This section will discuss the ex-
tent to which the Court has allowed universities to consider classifications
based on race or gender in their admissions policies.
1. Race-Conscious Admissions Policies
Educational affirmative action has generated a significant amount of
case law and commentary, but the focus has primarily been on race-
conscious admissions programs.67 Although race has been considered an
"inherently suspect" classification calling for the highest scrutiny, 68 the Su-
preme Court has ruled that college admissions policies may take race into
account if the policy is sufficiently "narrowly tailored." 69
In the 1978 case Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, the
Supreme Court for the first time addressed the issue of race-based affirma-
tive action in the university context and held that race could be taken into
consideration in college admissions.70 Having been denied admission to a
state medical school, a white male challenged the legality of the school's
admissions policy, which reserved sixteen of one hundred available posi-
tions for minority students. Justice Powell held that while this particular
race-conscious policy was illegal because it functioned more like a quota
than individualized consideration, a "[s]tate has a substantial interest that le-
gitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involv-
ing the competitive consideration of race and ethnic origin." 72 Justice Pow-
65. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 832 (1998).
66. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978).
67. Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1173; Jaschik, supra note 8.
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 291 ("Racial and ethnic distinctions of any sort are inherently suspect and
thus call for the most exacting judicial examination.").
69. See, e.g., id. at 265; Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
244 (2003).
70. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
71. Id. at 269-70,279.
72. Id. at 320.
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ell extolled Harvard College's admissions program, using it as an illustration
of the proper way to consider race in university admissions, and stressed the
need for individualized consideration of the applicants in the admissions
process.73
Applying strict scrutiny, Justice Powell rejected several of the interests
asserted by the university as justification for the race-conscious policy, in-
cluding the goal of "remedying societal discrimination," and recognized on-
ly one state interest as compelling: "the attainment of a diverse student
body." 74 This decision paved the way for universities to use race as one of a
number of factors in the admissions process. According to Justice
O'Connor, "[p]ublic and private universities across the Nation have modeled
their own admissions programs on Justice Powell's views on permissible
race-conscious policies."7' However, none of the six separate opinions pro-
duced in Bakke commanded a majority of the Court.7 6 In fact, the only hold-
ing in Bakke was that the consideration of race in admissions may legiti-
mately serve a substantial state interest.77
After Bakke, the use of race in university admissions policies was not
addressed again by the Court until 2003 in Grutter v. Bollinger.7' Following
the rationale in Bakke, the Court upheld a race-conscious admissions policy,
finding that the school had established a compelling state interest in diversi-
ty. 79 Justice O'Connor recognized that since Bakke, "Justice Powell's opi-
nion ... has served as the touchstone for constitutional analysis of race-
conscious admissions policies."o In Grutter, a white female applicant who
was denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School challenged
the legality of the school's race-conscious admissions policy." The univer-
sity claimed that the goal of the policy was "to ensure that a critical mass of
underrepresented minority students would be reached so as to realize the
educational benefits of a diverse student body."8 2 Because there was disa-
73. Id. at 316-19. The Harvard Program did consider race as a factor in some of its admissions
decisions in order to achieve its goal of diversity, but instead of "set target-quotas," it only ever con-
sidered race as a "'plus' in a particular applicant's file." Id. at 316-17. The program's key feature
was that it "treat[ed] each applicant as an individual in the admissions process." Id. at 318.
74. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 323-25 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 311).
75. Id. at 323.
76. Id. at 322.
77. Id. at 322-23.
78. Id. at 314, 322, 328.
79. Id. at 328-29.
80. Id. at 323.
81. Id. at 316-17.
82. Id. at 318. An admissions director "testified that 'critical mass' means 'meaningful numbers'
or 'meaningful representation', which she understood to mean a number that encourages underrepre-
sented minority students to participate in the classroom and not feel isolated." Id. The admissions
director also "stated there is no number, percentage, or range of numbers or percentages that consti-
tute critical mass," and that "she must consider the race of applicants because a critical mass of un-
derrepresented minority students could not be enrolled if admissions decisions were based primarily
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greement among the Courts of Appeals as to whether the holding in Bakke
was binding precedent that established diversity as a compelling state inter-
est, the Court granted certiorari to resolve the question of "[w]hether diversi-
ty is a compelling interest that can justify the narrowly tailored use of race"
as a factor in public universities' admissions decisions.83
Justice O'Connor ultimately upheld the right of universities to consider
race in admissions decisions.8 4  According to Chief Justice Roberts in the
recent Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No.
1 case, "[t]he entire gist of the analysis in Grutter was that the admissions
program at issue there focused on each applicant as an individual, and not
simply as a member of a particular racial group."" As Justice O'Connor
stated, "The importance of this individualized consideration in the context of
a race-conscious admissions program is paramount."8 6  The Grutter Court
used the narrow tailoring analysis of strict scrutiny to make certain that the
use of race in admissions was, in fact, "part of a broader assessment of di-
versity," and not simply a "patently unconstitutional" attempt to achieve ra-
cial balance. 7
Gratz v. Bollinger, which was decided the same day as Grutter, also in-
volved an admissions policy that considered race, but the Court in Gratz
found the policy was not narrowly tailored to accomplish its objective, and
was, therefore, unconstitutional." In Gratz, white applicants who had been
denied admission to the University of Michigan alleged that the university's
race-conscious undergraduate admissions policy violated the Equal Protec-
on undergraduate GPAs and LSAT scores." Id.
83. Id. at 321-22. Compare Hopwood v. Texas (Hopwoodl), 78 F.3d 932 (5th Cir. 1995) (hold-
ing that diversity is not a compelling state interest), with Smith v. Univ. of Wash., Law School, 233
F.3d 1188 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that it is).
84. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 343.
85. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2753 (2007) (cit-
ing Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330).
86. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337.
87. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2753 (quoting Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330). A
number of factors have been distilled from Grutter as a framework for determining whether a race-
conscious admissions policy is sufficiently narrowly-tailored to pass constitutional muster. See
Grutter, 539 U.S. at 333-43. According to the Smith v. University of Washington case,
[T]he Supreme Court [in Grutter] discussed five hallmarks of a narrowly tailored affir-
mative action plan: (1) the absence of quotas; (2) individualized consideration of appli-
cants; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of race-neutral alternatives to the affirmative
action program; (4) that no member of any racial group was unduly harmed; and (5) that
the program had a sunset provision or some other end point.
Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 2004). Cf Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v.
Seattle Sch. Dist., No. 1, 377 F.3d 949, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2004) (deriving six "governing constraints"
from Grutter and Gratz).
88. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 251, 275 (2003).
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tion Clause.89 Unlike in Grutter, where the admissions policy considered
race in a "limited way," the policy in Gratz relied more heavily on race by
automatically awarding points to every minority applicant prior to an indivi-
dualized review.90 Thus, Grutter and Gratz "ratified ... that educational di-
versity constitutes a compelling state interest," 91 which may justify the use
of a race-conscious admissions policy, while emphasizing the importance of
individualized evaluation of each applicant.
2. Gender-Conscious Admissions Policies
The Supreme Court has yet to consider a constitutional challenge to an
admissions policy that prefers male applicants, but the Court has ruled on the
constitutionality of gender-conscious admissions policies in the single-sex
college context. 92  These cases provide some insight into the Supreme
Court's attitude toward the use of gender as a factor in university admissions
decisions.
In Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, a male nurse who had
been denied admission to a state-supported all-female nursing school chal-
lenged the school's single-sex admissions policy under the Equal Protection
Clause. 93 The Court did not find the State's asserted justification of com-
pensation for past discrimination to be persuasive, finding instead that the
policy of excluding males "tend[ed] to perpetuate the stereotyped view of
89. Id. at 249-52.
90. Id. at 274. "It should be readily apparent that the availability of this review, which comes
after the automatic distribution of points, is far more limited than the individualized review given to
the 'large middle group of applicants' discussed by Justice Powell and described by the Harvard plan
in Bakke." Id. at 274 n.21.
91. Smith, 392 F.3d at 369.
92. See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 515 (1996) (holding that all-male military
college denied admission to females on the basis of gender). However, at least one court has held
that public universities violate the law when they prefer men over women for the sake of gender bal-
ance. See Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. Sys. of Ga., 106 F. Supp. 2d 1362, 1372-73 (S.D.
Ga. 2000) (striking down a gender- and race-conscious admissions policy), affd, 263 F.3d 1234
(11th Cir. 2001). In Johnson, three white female applicants who were rejected for admission by the
University of Georgia challenged the university's admissions policy, which awarded additional
points to both male and minority applicants. Id. at 1365-66. They alleged that the policy violated
Titles VI and IX of the Civil Rights Act, respectively. Id. at 1366-67. The district court found that
"[t]he record reveals that UGA's gender bonus points, despite being cloaked in the language of 'di-
versity-fostering,' represent nothing more than inartfully veiled gender balancing" and that "[sluch
gender preferencing would not even survive the less rigorous intermediate scrutiny employed in sex-
based equal protection claims." Id. at 1375-76 n.10. The court did not find the university's "desire
to 'help out' men who are not earning baccalaureate degrees in the same numbers as women" to be
persuasive. Id. at 1376 n.10. The defendants appealed the court's ruling regarding the preferential
treatment of minorities, but did not challenge the ruling on the legality of the gender preference.
Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1237 (11th Cir. 2001). As a result,
the Eleventh Circuit analyzed the race but not the gender issue.
93. 458 U.S. 718, 720-21 (1982). The specific issue the Court decided was "whether a state sta-
tute that excludes males from enrolling in a state-supported professional nursing school violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 719.
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nursing as an exclusively woman's job."94 Applying intermediate scrutiny,
Justice O'Connor ultimately ruled that even if the State had convinced the
Court that the "benign" purpose of "compensat[ion] for discriminatory bar-
riers faced by women" was the actual purpose behind the single-sex admis-
sions policy, the State failed to prove that the sex classification was substan-
tially related to this purpose, and the admissions policy, therefore, was
unconstitutional. 95 This opinion emphasized the need for the Court to con-
duct a "reasoned analysis" of the gender-based classification to make sure
that the classification did not rest on outdated stereotypes. 96
The 1996 VMI decision also stressed the importance of heightened judi-
cial review of gender classifications as a response to the country's history of
sex discrimination. 97  In VMI, prompted by a complaint filed by a female
high-school student, the United States sued the Commonwealth of Virginia,
which financially supported Virginia Military Institute (Institute), a single-
sex public military college. 98 The United States alleged that barring women
from access to the educational opportunities available at the Institute vi-
olated the applicant's constitutional right to equal protection.99 Virginia at-
tempted to justify the single-sex policy by arguing that "single-sex education
provides important educational benefits," and that the Institute's unique "ad-
94. Id. at 729. Justice O'Connor explains the principles behind her analysis. Id. at 724-26 ("Al-
though the test for determining the validity of a gender-based classification is straightforward, it
must be applied free of fixed notions concerning roles and abilities of males and females. Care must
be taken in ascertaining whether the statutory objective itself reflects archaic and stereotypic notions.
Thus, if the statutory objective is to exclude or 'protect' members of one gender because they are
presumed to suffer from an inherent handicap or to be innately inferior, the objective itself is illegi-
timate. If the State's objective is legitimate and important, we next determine whether the requisite
direct, substantial relationship between objective and means is present. The purpose of requiring
that close relationship is to assure that the validity of a classification is determined through reasoned
analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional, often inaccurate, assumptions
about the proper roles of men and women. The need for the requirement is amply revealed by refer-
ence to the broad range of statutes already invalidated by this Court, statutes that relied upon the
simplistic, outdated assumption that gender could be used as a 'proxy for other, more germane bases
of classification[]' to establish a link between objective and classification." (quoting Craig v. Boren,
429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976)) (citations and footnotes omitted)).
95. Id. at 729-30. However, the exclusion of males from nursing school was invalidated by only
a five-to-four vote. Because the government failed to meet the intermediate standard of review, Jus-
tice O'Connor found it unnecessary to decide whether gender classifications should be subject to
strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 724 n.9.
96. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
97. See VMI, 518 U.S. at 531 ("Today's skeptical scrutiny of official action denying rights or
opportunities based on sex responds to volumes of history. As a plurality of this Court acknowl-
edged a generation ago, 'our Nation has had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination."'
(quoting Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684 (1973))).
98. Id. at 520, 523.
99. Id. at 523.
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versative approach[] would have to be modified were [the Institute] to admit
women." 00 The Court ultimately struck down the Institute's single-sex ad-
missions policy, finding that the school's purported interest was not genuine,
and was created post hoc for purposes of litigation.01 The failure of the
admissions programs in Hogan and Reed to hold up under intermediate scru-
tiny demonstrates the substantial hurdle that states will face if forced to de-
fend a gender-based affirmative action program.
D. Gender-Based Affirmative Action in College Admissions as a Response
to the Growing Gender Imbalance
The statistics paint a clear picture of the growing gender imbalance col-
leges are experiencing. 102  The most controversial way that universities are
responding to the inequality in representation between males and females is
to favor males in the admissions process. 13 One way to advantage males is
100. Id. at 535.
101. Id. at 535-36, 539-40. Justice Ginsburg began her analysis by noting that "the core instruc-
tion of this Court's pathmarking decisions" was that "[p]arties who seek to defend gender-based
government action must demonstrate an 'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action." Id. at
531. Justice Ginsburg summarized what she thought to be "the Court's current directions for cases"
involving gender classifications:
Focusing on the differential treatment or denial of opportunity for which relief is sought,
[a court reviewing an official classification based on gender under the equal protection
analysis] must determine whether the proffered justification is "exceedingly persuasive."
The burden of justification is demanding and it rests entirely on the State. The State must
show "at least that the challenged classification serves 'important governmental objec-
tives and that the discriminatory means employed' are 'substantially related to the
achievement of those objectives."' The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized
or invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on overbroad genera-
lizations about the different talents, capacities, or preferences of males and females.
Id. at 532-33 (citations omitted). Justice Ginsburg went on to state that "[t]he heightened review
standard ... does not make sex a proscribed classification," because while "'inherent differences'
are no longer accepted as a ground for race or national origin classifications," by contrast,
"[p]hysical differences between men and women ... are enduring. . . ." Id. at 533.
102. See Jennifer Delahunty Britz, Op-Ed., To All the Girls I've Rejected, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23,
2006, at A25, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/03/23/opinion/23britz.htm ("Today, two-
thirds of colleges and universities report that they get more female than male applicants, and more
than 56 percent of undergraduates nationwide are women. Demographers predict that by 2009, only
42 percent of all baccalaureate degrees awarded in the United States will be given to men."); supra
notes 2-5 and accompanying text. An analysis by the Christian Science Monitor "shows the gap
falling across all types and sizes of institutions, with 83 percent of 1,006 coed schools having fewer
undergraduate men than women." Clayton, supra note 1. Various factors have been offered to ex-
plain why the percentage of women in higher education has been steadily growing. See, e.g., id.
("Some point a finger at a lack of male role models among teachers, or a K-12 ethos that is unac-
commodating to boys. Others target an anti-intellectual culture among boys. A thriving economy
and a wealth of computer-oriented jobs have also lured away males who otherwise might have at-
tended to higher academic credentials."); see also Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 51 ("Across the board,
girls study more, score better, and are less likely to be placed in special education classes.").
103. In 2006, the dean of admissions at Kenyon College, a private liberal-arts college, explained
that in the Kenyon admissions process, "because young men are rarer, they're more valued appli-
cants." Britz, supra note 102. The Kenyon dean was sharply criticized for disclosing this preference
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for a university to employ a point-based admissions system, with the highest
scoring students being offered a spot in the incoming class. 104 Under this
system, an applicant might be required to meet a threshold score in order to
further be considered for admission.o This threshold score might be based
on factors such as high school grades and standardized test scores. Once a
student overcomes this initial hurdle, the admissions officers may consider a
variety of "soft factors," including: (1) the quality of the applicant's personal
statement; (2) extracurricular activities; (3) community service; (4) strength
of recommendations; and (5) alumni relationships.
One way a university might include the gender factor would be to assign
extra points to a student just for being the desired sex. Another way would
be to add up the initial point score and the points from the "soft factors" and
to simply admit more males than females from the highest scoring group. In
any scenario, giving men priority just for being men may mean that a less
qualified male, in terms of grades, test scores, and "soft factors," may beat
out a more qualified female. Were a rejected female applicant to find out
that this type of point-based system was the reason she was not accepted, it
might incense her to the point of litigation. However, "any individual fe-
male student will have imperfect information about the reasons why she was
rejected from an institution. . . ."106 "[P]ublic universities, likely because of
their obligations under Title IX and the Constitution, have been more cir-
cumspect about acknowledging any such preferences for males than have
private undergraduate colleges (whose admissions policies are exempted
from Title IX's coverage)."10 7 Indeed, there seems to be a general reluc-
tance of colleges to admit a preference for males, as well as a "'natural mur-
kiness' of the admissions process,"08 which makes it difficult to determine
how, or whether, gender is actually factored into admissions decisions.As
one commentator said: "The elephant that looms large in the middle of the
for males, and other admissions directors refused to speak out on the issue. Richard Whitmire, The
Latest Way to Discriminate Against Women, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUc., July 20, 2007, at B16,
available athttp://chronicle.com/weekly/v53/i46/46b01601.htm.
104. See, e.g., Johnson v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Ga., 263 F.3d 1234, 1239-42 (11th Cir.
2001) (describing a state university's admissions program which calculated a "Total Student In-
dex").
105. This hypothetical admissions program appeared in the 2008 Chicago Bar Association Moot
Court Competition. Karla L. Bell & Sonja C. Rice, 2008 Chicago Bar Association Moot Court
Competition (2006) (on file with author).
106. E-mail from Emily J. Martin, Deputy Director of Women's Rights Project, American Civil
Liberties Union, to author (June 1, 2009) (on file with author).
107. Id.
108. Whitmire, supra note 103.
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room is the importance of gender balance."1 09 Is the need for an equal num-
ber of male and female students so great that it should "trump the qualifica-
tions of talented young female applicants?"1 o To some, "[gender-balanced
coeducation is] a key part of the learning environment ... [which] is critical
to academic discourse."" Others feel the impact is neutral. 112 One of the
main concerns about gender imbalance is a phenomenon called "tipping." A
university's population "tips" when one gender makes up sixty percent or
more of the overall enrollment.113 Anecdotal evidence suggests that once a
campus reaches the 60/40 "tipping point" in favor of either gender, the cam-
pus becomes less attractive to both male and female applicants, 114 thus mak-
ing it more difficult to attract the highest quality applicants. 15
Because the use of gender as a factor in admissions decisions is not
something that schools tend to advertise, it is difficult to gauge the extent of
the practice, and "there's disagreement on how big or pervasive the problem
is." 116  Some believe that male affirmative action is a common practice,
though it may often be so subtle that it flies below the legal radar.117  Ac-
109. Britz, supra note 102.
110. Id.
111. Mark Clayton, Gender Gap Is Far from Academic for Colleges, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
May 22, 2001, at 15, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0522/pl5sl.html (statement of
Nancy Meislahn, Wesleyan Admissions Director).
112. Id. ("I don't think it affects the academic quality of my classes at all to have more women,"
quoting Richard Hart, chair of the philosophy department at Bloomfield.).
113. Britz, supra note 102.
114. Kingsbury, supra note 1, at 52.
115. Clayton, supra note 1 ("First-tier universities generally have an abundance of both male and
female applicants. But schools without big reputations may need a gender balance to attract quality
applicants."). Another concern is the societal impact of the gender imbalance. A policy analyst with
the Center for the Study of Opportunity and Higher Education said that "[bly the end of the decade,
an estimated 200,000 college-educated women won't find a college-educated man to marry." Id.
116. Id. ("'There is not a generalized educational crisis among men, but there are real pockets of
problems,' writes Jacqueline King, a policy analyst at the American Council on Education in Wash-
ington."); Mary Beth Marklein, Colleges Remain Cautious in Handling Gender Diversity, USA
TODAY, Oct. 20, 2005, at 2A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/education/2005-10-19-
male-college-side x.htm ("'I don't want to say people don't notice,' says Sanford Ungar, president
of Goucher College in Baltimore, where the male/female breakdown is roughly 32/68. 'We're just
not hung up about it.' While the imbalances are most pronounced on liberal arts campuses, they also
show up at large public flagship schools. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill has a
male/female ratio of 42/58, while the ratio at the universities of Delaware, Georgia and New Mexico
hover around 43/57. Echoing the words of other admissions officials, University of Delaware ad-
missions director Louis Hirsh says, 'We're not about to take an unqualified male over a qualified
woman.' But he would take notice of males showing interest in majors such as teaching or nursing,
where they are underrepresented. Similarly, females applying to engineering programs would grab
his attention. 'I think people would say there really is a compelling social interest in having both
genders equally represented in those disciplines,' he says.").
117. Clayton, supra note 10 ("[A]round the United States, many colleges and universities are
practicing 'affirmative action for men,' legal experts and others say. The practices may be more
subtle than were Georgia's [in the Johnson case], making it harder to charge that they are illegal. ...
'It's wrong to put your thumb on the scale for a male applicant when you've got a better-qualified
female, but I know the colleges are doing it because they've told me,' says Thomas Mortenson, a
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cording to the Deputy Director of the ACLU Women's Rights Project, "the
practice is of concern and could well lead to additional litigation."18 As one
commentator noted: "Even if this issue is not about to parallel the recent
wave of court challenges to racial affirmative action, it is nonetheless spark-
ing debate in higher education."11 9 Perhaps if the fire gets hot enough, the
Supreme Court will be urged to rule on the constitutionality of gender-
conscious admissions policies.
III. THOUGHTS ON THE APPROPRIATE STANDARD OF REVIEW FOR GENDER
CLASSIFICATIONS
For awhile it was fairly clear that gender classifications received inter-
mediate scrutiny and race classifications received strict scrutiny. 12 0 The line
has since become fuzzy. 12 1 What the Court will or should do regarding the
appropriate standard of review for gender classifications has been subject to
much speculation, with many different ideas about the future of the gender
standard of review. This section will briefly summarize various issues the
Court may take into consideration when deciding what standard to apply.
The VMI case and its "exceedingly persuasive justification" language is
one of the most common sources of debate. In VMI, the United States asked
the Supreme Court to rule that the Court must apply strict scrutiny to gender-
based classifications. 122 In response, Justice Ginsburg stated that "[p]arties
policy analyst at the Center for the Study of Opportunity and Higher Education in Washington.").
118. E-mail from Emily J. Martin, Deputy Director of Women's Rights Project, American Civil
Liberties Union, to author (June 1, 2009) (on file with author).
119. Clayton, supra note 10.
120. See NowAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 845 ("The adoption of the substantial relation-
ship to an important governmental interest standard by a majority of the Justices has settled, at least
formally, the issue of the proper definition of a middle level standard of review for gender classifica-
tions. However, that standard of review is such that it allows Justices to base their votes upon indi-
vidual perceptions of the reasonableness of a gender classification and the governmental interest
asserted in each case. Were our country to adopt a constitutional amendment prohibiting gender
discrimination by governmental agencies, the Court would have to employ some form of strict scru-
tiny or compelling interest test under that amendment which would limit the ability of individual
judges to argue for the legitimacy of gender classifications based upon their personal perceptions of
the reasonableness of allocating rights by gender.").
12 1. Indeed, Justice Scalia has stated that the "rational basis," "intermediate scrutiny," and "strict
scrutiny," tests are "no more scientific than their names suggest, and a further element of random-
ness is added by the fact that it is largely up to [the Justices] which test will be applied in each case."
United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 567 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122. Brake, supra note 28, at 953. "The time has come to decide that strict scrutiny applies."
Brief for Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 2, United States v.
Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703392. "The standard of intermediate
scrutiny for gender classifications has proved an unworkable half-measure." Id. "Despite decisions
of this Court strengthening the intermediate scrutiny standard, lower courts have had great difficulty
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who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an
'exceedingly persuasive justification' for that action."123 The outcome of
this decision has been interpreted in a variety of ways, including: "(1) inter-
mediate scrutiny continues to apply to gender-based classifications; (2)
gender classifications are subject to strict scrutiny; and (3) gender classifica-
tions are now subject to a level of analysis which falls between strict and in-
termediate scrutiny."l24 However, it is possible that Justice Ginsburg's
statement was not meant to alter the standard at all, but rather her choice of
words had unintended consequences.
For those who question the appropriateness of intermediate scrutiny for
gender classifications, a new fourth level of scrutiny, the "heightened" in-
termediate standard, may seem like an adequate compromise. 125  Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist, who concurred only in judgment in VMI and had opposed
even the use of the intermediate standard of review for gender in Craig and
Frontiero, would have disagreed. 126 Others have argued that VMI did not
actually create a new level of scrutiny, but rather the "exceedingly persua-
sive" language was just a description of the evidentiary burden required to
meet the "substantially related" test. 127 Still others, like Justice Scalia in his
assessing the importance of governmental interests and in calibrating whether the fit between the
classification and the government's purpose is 'substantially related."' Id. at 6. "The lower courts
have complained repeatedly that the standard provides little guidance for decisionmaking [sic]." Id.
"Clarification of the proper standard of review for gender-based classifications is also necessary to
ensure consistency in this Court's jurisprudence." Id. at 12.
123. VMI, 518 U.S. at 531 (majority opinion). Interestingly, "Ruth Bader Ginsburg has long ad-
vocated heightened scrutiny for sex-based classifications and in fact drafted the ACLU brief in Reed
v. Reed, which urged the Court to adopt strict scrutiny for sex-based classifications." Steven A. Del-
chin, Comment, United States v. Virginia and Our Evolving "Constitution": Playing Peek-a-Boo
with the Standard of Scrutiny for Sex-Based Classifications, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 1121, 1125
n.34 (1997) (citation omitted).
124. Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1182.
125. See id. at 1196 ("Applying the same level of 'exceedingly persuasive justification' scrutiny to
all gender-based classifications, including affirmative action, correctly resolves the circuit split.
Both affirmative action and gender-based classification case law support the conclusion that gender
and race-based affirmative action programs should be treated differently, while gender classifica-
tions, whether they involve affirmative action or not, should be treated the same.").
126. VMI, 518 U.S. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("While terms like 'important govern-
mental objective' and 'substantially related' are hardly models of precision, they have more content
and specificity than does the phrase 'exceedingly persuasive justification."').
127. See id. ("That phrase is best confined, as it was first used, as an observation on the difficulty
of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself."). In Nguyen v. INS, the lan-
guage of the Court's opinion may suggest that it considers the "exceedingly persuasive justification"
standard to mean the same thing as intermediate scrutiny. 533 U.S. 53 (2001). In Nguyen, a statute
established different requirements a parent must meet for their child to acquire citizenship depending
upon whether the citizen parent is the mother or father. Id. at 56-57. The Court stated that it has
"explained that an exceedingly persuasive justification is established by showing at least that the
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 70 (citing Miss. Univ. for
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Further, it stated
that "a party who seeks to defend a statute that classifies individuals on the basis of sex must carry
the burden of showing an exceedingly persuasive justification for the classification." Id. at 74
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VMI dissent, argue that the rationale of the majority's decision redefined in-
termediate scrutiny to make it indistinguishable from strict scrutiny. 128  it
has also been suggested that the VMI decision signaled a progression toward
using strict scrutiny for gender classifications. 129
Several commentators have analyzed Supreme Court decisions and ga-
thered evidence they believe suggests that the Court has not shut the door to
the possibility of applying strict scrutiny to gender classifications. 13 0 Specif-
ically, two footnotes are claimed to be especially telling.131  In Hogan, Jus-
tice O'Connor noted that the Court "need not decide whether classifications
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, "[t]he defender of the classification meets this burden only by showing at least that the
classification serves important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory means employed
are substantially related to the achievement of those objectives." Id. at 75 (internal quotation marks
omitted). However, Nguyen is an illegitimacy rather than gender discrimination case, and thus the
Court has never explicitly stated that "exceedingly persuasive" is the same thing as intermediate re-
view for gender discrimination.
128. VMI, 518 U.S. at 566-603 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see Delchin, supra note 123, at 1130 ("The
peculiar wording in Justice Ginsburg's VMI opinion has generated much speculation over whether
the Court is abandoning intermediate scrutiny in favor of strict scrutiny for sex-based classifica-
tions."); Brake, supra note 61, at 35-36 ("Although some commentators read the decision as a rebuff
to the United States government's request that the Court adopt strict scrutiny for gender, the decision
in fact strikes a careful balance in crafting a standard with the teeth, if not the name, of strict scruti-
ny.... While the Court stopped short of explicitly adopting strict scrutiny for sex-based classifica-
tions, the opinion includes a number of indicators suggesting that the standard applied in VMI is es-
sentially as rigorous as today's strict scrutiny standard.").
129. Delchin, supra note 123, at 1134 ("The statements, formulations, and descriptions in the VMI
majority opinion may presage the Court's final 'evolution' to strict scrutiny for sex-based classifica-
tions. . . . Thus, just as Reed was the esoteric instrument for establishing intermediate scrutiny, so
VMJ may be the instrument for establishing strict scrutiny.").
130. Brief for Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 4-5, United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703392 ("[Ajmici urge that the
Court take this opportunity in this case to hold that sex is a suspect class under the Equal Protection
Clause-a question this Court has repeatedly left open.").
Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion in the V.M.I. case noted that the Supreme Court had
not yet equated gender classifications "for all purposes, to classifications based on race or
national origin." . . .Because the state case was unable to meet the intermediate standard
in the V.M.I. case, the majority did not have to address the question of whether gender
classifications in education should be reviewed with strict judicial scrutiny.
NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 27, at 843. "In addition to applying strong formulations of inter-
mediate scrutiny in recent years, the Court has also gone out of its way not to foreclose a future rul-
ing adopting strict scrutiny for gender classifications." Brake, supra note 28, at 958. "Since estab-
lishing intermediate scrutiny in 1976, a majority of the Court has twice noted that the issue of
whether gender classifications warrant strict scrutiny is an open question." Id. "Even before the
decision in [VM], there were indications that some members of the Court viewed the traditional in-
termediate scrutiny standard as a temporary measure." Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1190.
131. "[W]hile footnotes do not decide cases, they often contain clues about the future leanings of
the Court." Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1190.
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based upon gender are inherently suspect."132 The majority's opinion in
JE.B. contained a nearly identical footnote: "Because we conclude that
gender-based peremptory challenges are not substantially related to an im-
portant government objective, we once again need not decide whether classi-
fications based on gender are inherently suspect."133 The existence of these
footnotes has been interpreted as an "explicit recognition that strict scrutiny
remains a possibility for gender discrimination" in future Supreme Court
cases. 134
Another source of confusion about the appropriate level of scrutiny is
the alleged paradoxes created by applying different levels of scrutiny. 135
One possible anomaly results from the fact that by applying intermediate
scrutiny to gender-based affirmative action programs, race-based programs
must meet a stricter legal test than gender-based programs. Because of this,
"it is more likely that a race-based remedial program will be invalidated than
an affirmative action program based on gender, even though racial minori-
ties are meant to receive a higher level of protection from discrimination
than women."1 36 A related anomaly is that women would have less constitu-
tional protection from state-sponsored gender discrimination than white men
would have from reverse discrimination by race-conscious affirmative action
programs. 137 However, it is also argued that if gender-based classifications
are analyzed under strict scrutiny, "it will be easier for governments to dis-
criminate against women than to remedy discrimination against them." 138
These anomalies will eventually need to be resolved within the Court's equal
protection doctrine.
Another phenomenon that the Court may take notice of is the fact that
some state courts are already treating sex as a suspect class, and are applying
strict scrutiny in gender cases even though federal courts require only inter-
mediate scrutiny. 139 As noted before, nearly half the states have enacted civ-
132. Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9 (citing Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 13 (1975)).
133. J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 137 n.6 (1994).
134. Brake, supra note 28, at 958.
135. See Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1175-76 ("A primary reason that the proper level of scrutiny
for gender-based affirmative action programs is such a difficult issue is that there are troubling para-
doxes associated with both approaches."); Brake, supra note 28, at 961-62 ("New anomalies in
equal protection doctrine created by the Supreme Court's recent affirmative action decisions provide
a further reason for the Court to adopt strict scrutiny for gender discrimination.").
136. Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1175; see also Brake, supra note 28, at 961-62.
137. Brake, supra note 28, at 961-62. "If gender-based classifications continue to be evaluated
under intermediate scrutiny, white males will have greater constitutional protection from race-
conscious affirmative action, however benignly intended, than women will have from invidious sex
discrimination." Brief for Nat'l Women's Law Ctr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at
12, United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703392 (outlining spe-
cific reasons why strict scrutiny should be adopted for gender classification).
138. Brake, supra note 28, at 961-62; see Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1175-76.
139. "In some states, courts have ruled that the state ERAs have elevated sex to a suspect class,
thereby invoking a strict scrutiny review when a law differentiates on the basis of gender, even
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il rights legislation, as well as constitutional and statutory provisions, which
expressly prohibit sex discrimination. 140 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has many times compared gender discrimination to racial discrimination,
which perhaps suggests that the Court may feel it appropriate to apply the
same level of scrutiny to a gender-conscious admissions policy as it would
to a race-conscious program. 14 1 On the other hand, the Court has also hig-
hlighted the differences between race and gender discrimination. 142  Consi-
dering the amount of debate over the appropriate standard, it seems time for
the Court to hear a challenge to a gender-conscious admissions policy and
settle the appropriate standard of review for gender classifications, at least in
the context of educational affirmative action.
though the federal equal protection clause requires only an intermediate scrutiny of such a classifica-
tion." 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 837 (1998); see supra note 27 and accompanying text.
140. 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 826 (1998); Franzese, supra note 8, at 734; see supra
note 27 and accompanying text.
141. See, e.g., Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979) ("Classifications based
upon gender, not unlike those based upon race, have traditionally been the touchstone for pervasive
and often subtle discrimination." (citing Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 398 (1979) (Stewart,
J., dissenting))); J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 135 (1994) ("While the prejudicial attitudes to-
ward women in this country have not been identical to those held toward racial minorities, the simi-
larities between the experiences of racial minorities and women, in some contexts, 'overpower those
differences."' (citing Note, Beyond Batson: Eliminating Gender-Based Peremptory Challenges, 105
HARV. L. REv. 1920, 1921 (1992))); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973) (plurality
opinion) ("Moreover, since sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic deter-
mined solely by the accident of birth, the imposition of special disabilities upon the members of a
particular sex because of their sex would seem to violate 'the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.' And what differentiates sex
from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence or physical disability, and aligns it with the recog-
nized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform
or contribute to society." (citation omitted)); Brake, supra note 28, at 957 ("Recognizing the paral-
lels and similarities between race and sex discrimination in this country, the Court [in JE.B.] applied
wholesale a line of cases forbidding race discrimination in jury selection to the gender context. In
answering the question of whether equal protection 'forbids intentional discrimination on the basis
of gender, just as it prohibits discrimination on the basis of race,' the Court held that 'gender, like
race, is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence and impartiality."'); Skaggs, supra note 12,
at 1186 ("Thus, by drawing parallels between gender and racial classifications, the JE.B. opinion
provided a firm basis for raising the standard of scrutiny to be applied to gender-based classifications
in the future.").
142. "That race and sex discrimination are different is acknowledged by our equal protection juri-
sprudence, which accords different levels of protection to the two groups." JE.B., 511 U.S. at 154
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). "Racial groups comprise numerical minorities in our society, warrant-
ing in some situations a greater need for protection, whereas the population is divided almost equally
between men and women." Id. at 154-55. "After all, it is difficult to maintain that women, as a ma-
jority of the electorate, are somehow a 'discrete and insular minority' entitled to heightened scrutiny
under equal protection review." Delchin, supra note 123, at 1154.
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IV. APPLYING THE GRUTTER FRAMEWORK IN A GENDER CONTEXT
A. Equal Protection, Equal Standard
As should be clear by now, the Supreme Court has not yet spoken on
gender-conscious admissions policies in coeducational institutions. 143 How-
ever, the Court has addressed race-based classifications in the university
admissions context, and it set forth factors that courts can use to decide fu-
ture race-based classification cases.144 Regardless of what standard the
Court ultimately decides is appropriate when analyzing a gender-conscious
admissions policy, the Court should draw on its precedents in race-conscious
admissions to decide this matter of first impression.
The Grutter factors have the potential to give structure to the difficult-
to-define "narrowly tailored" or "substantially related" requirements. 145
These "hallmarks of a narrowly tailored affirmative action plan"1 46 provide a
solid framework for future race-based affirmative action cases. It is likely
that these factors are appropriate in the gender context as well and would
provide a helpful framework for analysis of gender cases. 147 Several com-
mentators have already suggested using Grutter-like factors as a framework
for gender-based affirmative action cases. One made "some educated
guesses" about how the Court could define the requirements using the "ex-
ceedingly persuasive justification" standard, including consideration of neu-
tral alternatives and an end date for the program. 148  Another proposed a
143. See Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1174 ("Because the only guidance the Supreme Court has pro-
vided for deciding affirmative action cases comes from opinions analyzing race-based programs un-
der strict scrutiny, the proper level of scrutiny for analyzing gender-based affirmative action is un-
clear.").
144. See supra note 87.
145. JE.B., 511 U.S. at 152 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("[T]he intermediate scrutiny test we have
applied may not provide a very clear standard in all instances . . . ."). "Even Justice Rehnquist, dis-
senting in Craig, criticized intermediate scrutiny as 'so diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective
judicial preferences or prejudices,' although Justice Rehnquist's solution would be to subject gender
classifications to rational basis, rather than strict scrutiny review." Brake, supra note 28, at 958-59
(citing specific examples of lower court confusion and misapplication of the intermediate scrutiny
standard) (footnote omitted).
146. Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 2004).
147. Though the Grutter test came from a case applying strict scrutiny because the admissions
policy was taking race into consideration, it is possible that the factors can be applied less stringently
under a lesser standard of review or can be modified to work within an intermediate or "heightened"
intermediate standard of review. A less complicated, though unlikely, solution would be for the
Court to decide to apply strict scrutiny to all protected classifications, including both race and gend-
er, in the educational affirmative action context.
148. Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1208-09 ("First, courts should require the consideration of alterna-
tive remedies for gender-based as well as race-base affirmative action.... Second, the concerns un-
derlying the relationship prong under strict scrutiny, such as the desire to benefit only those who are
the true victims of discrimination and the concern about stigmatizing the group benefiting from the
classification, apply to gender as well as race.... Third, consideration of gender-neutral remedies
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Grutter-esque multi-factor framework which is to be applied under an in-
termediate standard of review. 149
It is easy to jump to one of two conclusions about the level of scrutiny
required when the policy is benefiting males rather than a group that has his-
torically been discriminated against, like racial minorities or women. One
conclusion is that the level of scrutiny should be very high, because men do
not need protection. Therefore, colleges should be required to have a very
specific reason for discriminating against women so that it is difficult for
them to implement these types of policies. "0 The other conclusion is that
the level of scrutiny should remain intermediate. Because it is very unlikely
that a male affirmative action policy would pass intermediate scrutiny, let
alone strict scrutiny, the more deferential standard should suffice."1' How-
ever, it is important to resist the temptation to pick a standard based on the
fact that it is men-as opposed to a historically disenfranchised group-who
are benefiting in this particular scenario.
Whichever standard the Court chooses to apply when reviewing the
constitutionality of a gender-conscious admissions policy, the standard
should be the same whether the affirmative action is benefiting males or fe-
males. The level of scrutiny should be based on the fact that universities are
classifying applicants-arguably a similarly situated group-for different
does not require an actual attempt to implement these plans.... Fourth, the duration of the program
should remain a relevant consideration. . . .Fifth, in terms of the link between the goals of a program
and the proportion of qualified women in the field, the requirement that women be compensated only
for particular economic disabilities mandates a close tie between the numerical goals of a gender-
based program and the proportion of qualified women in the market.").
149. Franzese, supra note 8, at 742-43 ("For a college's affirmative action policy to be substan-
tially related to achieving the asserted goal of diversity, the school must implement a plan truly de-
signed to increase the diversity of the class rather than simply enroll an equal proportion of male and
female students. To determine whether this relationship exists, courts should evaluate the flexibility
of the program, its consideration of gender-neutral factors, the disproportionate benefits to the fa-
vored class, and the existence of gender-neutral alternatives." (footnote omitted)). Franzese's factors
are: (1) "Rigid point systems do not constitute flexible affirmative action policies" (analogous to
Grutter factor number one, absence of quotas); (2) "Admissions officers must conduct an individua-
lized evaluation of each applicant including the consideration of gender neutral factors" (analogous
to Grutter factor number two, individualized consideration); (3) "Affirmative action policies must
not disproportionately benefit male applicants" (analogous to Grutter factor number four, no undue
harm); and (4) "Colleges must consider and reject gender neutral alternatives before adopting an
affirmative action policy that benefits male applicants" (analogous to Grutter factor number three,
consideration of neutral alternatives). Id. at 743-46.
150. "The choice between strict and intermediate scrutiny is quite significant in the context of
affirmative action, as it is much easier to justify an affirmative action plan under intermediate scruti-
ny than strict scrutiny." Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1176.
151. The Gender Curve article suggests a "framework to review the constitutionality of gender-
based affirmative action policies benefiting male students and concludes that such policies would fail
intermediate scrutiny." Franzese, supra note 8, at 738 (emphasis added).
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treatment based on their gender, rather than based on how the classification
affects one gender versus the other. In contrast to the uncertainty regarding
the appropriate standard of review for gender classifications, it seems fairly
well-settled that the Court does not change the standard of review based on
whether the class is benefited or burdened. 152 Therefore, the framework
must be the same for the review of gender-conscious admissions policies,
whether they benefit or discriminate against males or females. "The guaran-
tee of equal protection cannot mean one thing when applied to one individu-
al and something else when applied to a person of another [gender]."1 53 if
men and women "are not accorded the same protection, then it is not
equal." 15 4  Thus, even though intermediate scrutiny might be a sufficiently
stringent standard to strike down most male affirmative action policies,
"[t]hat intermediate scrutiny yields the right result in [one] case is not a good
reason to continue to apply it" to all gender-based classifications. 15
152. See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 723 (1982) ("That this statutory policy
discriminates against males rather than against females does not exempt it from scrutiny or reduce
the standard of review."); Skaggs, supra note 12, at 1198 ("[T]he Supreme Court has consistently
stated that the level of analysis under equal protection should not change based on the group that is
disadvantaged by the classification at issue. . . . Instead, the standard changes based on the type of
classification at issue."); 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 831 (1998) ("The Equal Protection
Clause protects against classifications based on gender. The standard of review under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause does not depend on the race or gender of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification."); Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724 n.9 ("Our past decisions establish ... that when a classifi-
cation expressly discriminates on the basis of gender, the analysis and level of scrutiny applied to
determine the validity of the classification do not vary simply because the objective appears accepta-
ble to individual Members of the Court.").
153. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 289-90 (1978). Women have been dis-
criminated against, and, furthermore, women are the losers in male affirmative action programs. If
the standard is based on the fact that men have not been discriminated against, this effectively makes
equal protection mean one thing when applied to women and another when applied to men. Just as
one's race alone is not relevant to one's success in college, one's gender arguably isn't either. Ra-
cial classifications are considered to be inherently suspect and are, therefore, automatically subject to
strict scrutiny because, among other reasons, people of different races do not have different physical
abilities in the same way that men and women do. But, in the context of a college education, these
inherent differences between men and women are not relevant, and, therefore, classification by
gender in college admissions should be inherently suspect. And, because gender in this context is
inherently suspect, strict scrutiny is appropriate. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686
(1973) (plurality opinion) ("[Wihat differentiates sex from such non-suspect statuses as intelligence
or physical disability, and aligns it with the recognized suspect criteria, is that the sex characteristic
frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society."). Though a majority of
the Court has never held sex to be an inherently suspect classification and applied strict scrutiny to a
gender classification, it has not closed the door to the possibility. See supra notes 134-38 and ac-
companying text.
154. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 290.
155. Brief for Nat'l Women's Law Cit. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 5, United
States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996) (No. 94-1941), 1995 WL 703392; NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 27, at 635 ("[Cjlassifications are not tested by whether or not the individuals are truly
different in some absolute sense from those who receive different treatment. For example, it is un-
deniably true that men and women are biologically different. However that difference does not
mean that gender-based classifications will be generally upheld, for most often there is no difference
between men and women in terms of the promotion of a legitimate governmental end.").
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B. The Ends-Means Review
Whatever the level of scrutiny and whatever the challenged classifica-
tion, the Court's analysis under the Equal Protection Clause is an ends-
means review. First, the Court determines whether there is a sufficient go-
vernmental purpose asserted by the party as justification for treating similar-
ly situated people differently. 156 Second, the Court determines whether the
"means" to that end is appropriate. 157
1. The Ends Analysis
When evaluating an equal protection claim, the Court begins by examin-
ing whether the university has asserted sufficient governmental ends in sup-
port of its allegedly discriminatory admissions policy. However, there is a
problem with the ends analysis in that the Court does not really engage in
any. Instead of reasoned analysis, the Court has repeatedly made conclusory
statements about whether it thought the asserted state interest was "legiti-
mate," "important," "exceedingly persuasive," or "compelling"-pick your
standard."' Nevertheless, we do have some clues as to what the Court may
consider to be a constitutional end.
In evaluating the use of race-conscious admissions policies by universi-
ties, the Court has recognized two interests as compelling. 15 9 First, the
156. "Usually one must look to the end or purpose of the legislation in order to determine whether
persons are similarly situated in terms of that governmental system. The judiciary need not always
review the permissibility of the legislative purpose, but it must decide what is the end of the legisla-
tion to be tested. Once a court has found an end of government which does not in itself violate the
Constitution, it can analyze the way in which the government has classified persons in terms of that
end." 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 32, § 18.2.
157. Id.
158. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 356 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("A close
reading of the Court's opinion reveals that all of its legal work is done through one conclusory
statement: The Law School has a 'compelling interest in securing the educational benefits of a di-
verse student body."'). In his dissent in Craig, Justice Rehnquist "counsel[s] weightily against" re-
cognizing intermediate scrutiny as a third level of judicial review. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
221 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("How is this Court to divine what objectives are important?
How is it to determine whether a particular law is 'substantially' related to the achievement of such
objective, rather than related in some other way to its achievement? Both of the phrases used are so
diaphanous and elastic as to invite subjective judicial preferences or prejudices relating to particular
types of legislation, masquerading as judgments whether such legislation is directed at 'important'
objectives or, whether the relationship to those objectives is 'substantial' enough."). "While trying
to read the minds of Supreme Court justices is risky, it seems hard to imagine that Justice Ruth Bad-
er Ginsburg, author of the [VMI] decision, was thinking about a good ratio of dance partners as such
a[n important] government interest." Jaschik, supra note 8.
159. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 127 S. Ct. 2738, 2752-53 (2007).
"It is true that some language in [post-Bakke affirmative action] opinions might be read to suggest
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Court has found the "interest of remedying the effects of past intentional
discrimination" to be a compelling government interest. 160  Second, the
Court has upheld "the interest in diversity in higher education."1 6 1 Regard-
ing gender-based classifications, the Court has endorsed the following ends:
"to compensate women 'for particular economic disabilities they have suf-
fered,' to 'promote equal employment opportunity,' [and] to advance full
development of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people." 62 As the
Supreme Court has cautioned, however, "such classifications may not be
used ... to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferiority of
women." 163  Gender classifications must "be applied free of fixed notions
concerning the roles and abilities of males and females," so as not to rein-
force gender stereotypes. 16 4 It is an open question whether the Court's hold-
ing that racial diversity can be a compelling interest justifying some kinds of
racial preferences in higher education might lead courts to equate equality in
representation between the sexes with "diversity," and to conclude that a
gender balance might similarly further educational goals and thus justify a
preference for males, despite the absence of a need to remedy past discrimi-
nation. 165
One possible objective for male affirmative action that is very unlikely
to hold up in court would be one based on "customer preference": that the
gender ratio needs to be balanced because customers (potential applicants)
prefer to have a more balanced campus. 166 However, depending on the level
that remedying past discrimination is the only permissible justification for race-based governmental
action." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 328 (majority opinion) (citation omitted). However, the Court has
"never held that the only governmental use of race that can survive strict scrutiny is remedying past
discrimination." Id.
160. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch., 127 S. Ct. at 2752-53.
161. Id. at 2753; 16B C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1134 (2005) ("The attainment of a diverse stu-
dent body is a constitutionally permissible goal for an institution of higher education and ethnic di-
versity can be one element in a range of factors a university properly may consider in attaining the
goal of a heterogeneous student body. A state university's interest in achieving educational diversity
can constitute a compelling state interest capable of supporting a narrowly tailored means, for pur-
poses of determining whether that university's policy of using race in undergraduate admissions de-
cisions violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.").
162. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533-34 (1996) (citations omitted).
163. Id. at 534 (citation omitted).
164. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724-25 (1982).
165. But see Berkelman v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1268-70 (9th Cir. 1974) (hold-
ing that requiring higher admission standards for female than for male high school applicants vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and finding no support for the
notion "that a balance of the sexes furthers the goal of better academic education").
166. As the Fifth Circuit noted, "[I]t would be totally anomalous if we were to allow the prefe-
rences and prejudices of the customers to determine whether the sex discrimination was valid. In-
deed, it was, to a large extent, these very prejudices the [Civil Rights] Act was meant to overcome."
Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 389 (5th Cir. 1971); see Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971) (holding that passenger preference for single airline ste-
wardesses did not justify no-marriage rule that applied only to women); Fernandez v. Wynn Oil Co.,
653 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1981) (holding that customer preference based on sexual stereotype cannot
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of scrutiny applied and the state interest asserted by the university, the Court
may defer to a university's concerns about "tipping" affecting its ability to
attract quality applicants and its view on what the necessary gender balance
is. 16 7 Another purpose for male affirmative action that would not likely pass
any constitutional test is that of a need for a "critical mass." Although wom-
en are applying and attending university at a higher rate than men, males still
make up about forty percent of the student population. 168 In Grutter, the
Court supports the purpose of attaining a "critical mass" of minority stu-
dents. 169 A critical mass is defined as "numbers such that underrepresented
minority students do not feel isolated or like spokespersons for their race."170
This can be distinguished from "outright racial balancing, which is patently
unconstitutional."17 1  It seems very unlikely that a forty percent population
of male students would not be enough to constitute a critical mass as defined
in Grutter.172 Justices Scalia and Thomas would almost certainly agree: the
"mystical 'critical mass' justification for its discrimination by race chal-
lenges even the most gullible mind. The admissions statistics show it to be a
sham to cover a scheme of racially proportionate admissions." 173  Thus, in
justifying a gender-conscious admissions policy, a university will need to
look beyond customer preference and critical mass for a constitutionally
sound objective.
2. The Means Analysis
If the Court finds a permissible objective, it next determines "whether
the requisite . . . relationship between objective and means is present."1 74 If
the university is able to convince the Court of an "important" or "compel-
ling" government interest, the university will then be required to show either
that the discriminatory policy is "substantially related" to achieving its goal
justify discriminatory conduct). The "customer preference" idea and research appeared in the 2008
Chicago Bar Association Moot Court Competition problem cited supra note 105.
167. See supra notes 113-15 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
169. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003).
170. Id. at 318-19.
171. Id. at 330 (quoting Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 307 (1978)).
172. Jaschik, supra note 8 ("Some lawyers cautioned against viewing gender and race in admis-
sions in the same legal terms because the Supreme Court has generally subjected racial distinctions
to the highest scrutiny. But others-especially critics of affirmative action-said that if the
O'Connor standards were applied to gender, public colleges could be in trouble for favoring men,
since no one is suggesting that there isn't a critical mass of men in higher education.").
173. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 346-47 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
174. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982).
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(intermediate scrutiny), or is "narrowly tailored" to achieve its approved
purpose (strict scrutiny).17 ' Grutter may be especially helpful in establish-
ing whether the requisite relationship between the ends and the means ex-
ists. 176
The Court in Grutter acknowledged that public higher education is a
special context which requires the framework for analysis to "be calibrated
to fit the distinct issues raised."177 This respect for public higher education
as a special context provides support for applying the Grutter factors to both
race- and gender-conscious admissions policies, because it turns the focus to
protecting equality in education, rather than concentrating on the specific
classification at issue.
The following factors distilled from Grutter should be used to test the
constitutionality of the "means" of a university's gender-conscious admis-
sions policy: "(1) the absence of quotas; (2) individualized consideration of
applicants; (3) serious, good-faith consideration of [gender]-neutral alterna-
tives to the affirmative action program; (4) that no member of [either gend-
er] was unduly harmed; and (5) that the program had a sunset provision or
some other end point."178  Requiring the presence of these factors should
discourage universities from using gender-conscious policies as a facile so-
lution to correct a gender imbalance on campus. Providing some guidance
to universities in the formulation of their admissions policies may even lead
to voluntary compliance. Although these factors were used to describe how
a race-conscious admissions program could survive the narrowly-tailored
requirement under strict scrutiny, it does not make them less relevant to a
gender-conscious admissions policy which may be evaluated under a more
deferential standard of review. If the Court determines that intermediate or
heightened intermediate is the appropriate level of scrutiny, the Court could
apply these same factors in a less stringent manner, allowing the university
more leeway in its decision making, but still protecting the equality interest
of the applicants. The following sections illustrate how the Grutter factors
could be applied in a gender context.
a. No Quotas
In Grutter, Justice O'Connor explained that a constitutional admissions
policy does not use a quota system to achieve its goal. 17 9 Instead, a universi-
175. See id.
176. See supra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
177. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (majority opinion).
178. See Smith v. Univ. of Wash., 392 F.3d 367, 373 (9th Cir. 2004); supra note 87.
179. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 ("To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program
cannot use a quota system-it cannot 'insulate each category of applicants with certain desired quali-
fications from competition with all other applicants."' (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 315 (1978))). "The Court [in Grutter] defined a quota as (1) reserving a fixed number
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ty is permitted to count an applicant's race as a "'plus' in a particular appli-
cant's file." 8 o Applying this requirement to a gender-conscious admissions
policy would mean that a university could not employ a "male quota" or a
rigid point-based system to move the gender balance closer to 50/50, but
perhaps could consider an applicant's gender as a "plus," just as it would
consider extracurricular activities or extensive community service as plusses
on an application."' This would help to ensure that the university was not
enrolling more men than women without focusing on additional qualifica-
tions. 182
b. Individualized Consideration ofApplicants
Another way that a university could demonstrate the constitutionality of
its admissions program would be "to provide substantive evidence that the
plan includes an individual evaluation of all applicants and considers the di-
verse contributions that the student brings to the campus, other than his
gender." 8 3 Indeed, the Court in Grutter found the "importance of this indi-
vidualized consideration" to be "paramount." 18 4  This requirement would
help to ensure that gender was not the defining feature of a student's applica-
tion, but rather all applicants could be assured they were being judged on
their merits. 18
or proportion of opportunities-which must be attained and cannot be exceeded-for certain minori-
ty groups; and (2) insulating individuals from comparison with all other candidates for the available
seats." Smith, 392 F.3d at 374.
180. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317).
181. Franzese, supra note 8, at 743-44 ("Systems that award points based on an applicant's gend-
er constitute rigid and mechanized determinations that do not fully evaluate the applicant's talents
and abilities to enrich the student experience on campus. A court would likely find an attempt to
equalize the number of male and female students on campus for the sake of proportionality unconsti-
tutional because of its similarity to a quota system and the lack of individual evaluation of all appli-
cants.").
182. "'Some attention to numbers,' without more, does not transform a flexible admissions system
into a rigid quota." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 336 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 323).
183. Franzese, supra note 8, at 743. The "admissions program must be flexible enough to consid-
er all pertinent elements of diversity in light of the particular qualifications of each applicant, and to
place them on the same footing for consideration, although not necessarily according them the same
weight." Grutter, 539 U.S. at 334 (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 317) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
184. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 337 (citing Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318).
185. It seems that if applicants felt they had received a "highly individualized, holistic review,"
they would be less likely to feel that they had received unequal treatment. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at
337. Not all students have the same ability to fatten their college applications with potential "plus"
factors. For example, a high school student in an isolated, rural town may not have the same oppor-
tunities for community service as a student coming from an inner-city, but this does not mean that a
university may not take community service hours into consideration. However, if a lack of commu-
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c. Good-Faith Consideration of Gender-Neutral Alternatives
Grutter required a university, in good faith, to consider "workable race-
neutral alternatives" to its race-conscious admissions policy. 186  Applying
this requirement in the gender context would mean that a university would
need to have first considered gender-neutral alternatives before implement-
ing a gender-conscious admissions policy. When an admissions policy is
examined under intermediate scrutiny, the university is "not required to im-
plement a gender-conscious program only as a last resort." 1 7  In fact, even
strict scrutiny does not demand "exhaustion of every conceivable race-
neutral alternative.""' As alternatives to gender-conscious admissions poli-
cies, some universities have implemented "targeted recruitment programs,
changes in advertising materials, and the addition of sports teams to attract
male students," which arguably "cannot be considered neutral alterna-
tives."189 However, this does suggest that universities are experimenting
with solutions other than gender-conscious point-based admissions systems.
This "gender-neutral alternative" requirement would likely reinforce this ex-
perimentation, encouraging universities to expend more effort searching for
viable alternatives to formal gender-conscious admissions policies.190
d Policy Does Not Cause Undue Harm
Acknowledging that "there are serious problems of justice connected
with the idea of preference itself," the Court in Grutter declared that to be
constitutional, "a race-conscious admissions program [must] not unduly
harm members of any racial group."1 91 In the context of gender-based af-
nity service hours immediately disqualified an applicant, this would likely lead to a claim of discrim-
ination.
186. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339.
187. Hershell Gill Consulting Eng'rs, Inc. v. Miami-Dade County, 333 F. Supp. 2d 1305, 1332
(S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Eng'g Contractors Ass'n of S. Fla., Inc. v. Metro. Dade, 122 F.3d 895, 929
(11th Cir. 1997)).
188. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 339. "Narrow tailoring does not require exhaustion of every conceivable
race-neutral alternative. Nor does it require a university to choose between maintaining a reputation
for excellence or fulfilling a commitment to provide educational opportunities to members of all
racial groups." Id. (citing Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed., 476 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (1986); Richmond v.
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 509-10 (1989)).
189. Franzese, supra note 8, at 746. For example, one college "where about 45 percent of the stu-
dents are men, recently removed some pictures of women and minorities from its marketing mate-
rials in favor of more pictures featuring action shots of white males." Clayton, supra note 1.
190. In addition to encouraging neutral alternatives at the university level, this requirement may
reinforce early intervention measures that are aimed at improving the quality of education at the
primary level. According to many, preferential admissions policies used in higher education are
only masking the underlying causes of educational underachievement. See Corinne E. Anderson, A
Current Perspective: The Erosion of Affirmative Action in University Admissions, 32 AKRON L.
REv. 181, 230 (1999).
191. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 341 (quoting Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298
(1978)) ("Even remedial race-based governmental action generally 'remains subject to continuing
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firmative action, this requirement would mean that the policy must not undu-
ly burden the non-favored gender in terms of educational opportunities. In
other words, if the gender-conscious policy benefits males, it must not cause
undue harm to females. The Court in Grutter was satisfied that the school's
admissions policy did not unduly harm members of any group because the
program centered on individualized consideration of the applicants. 192  If
gender is used only as a plus, rather than as a decisive factor in a student's
application, a qualified woman may lose out on an admissions offer to a
less-qualified male; in such a case, the Court may consider this gender-
conscious policy a burden to women, but it may not consider it an undue
burden. 193
e. Policy Has a Reasonable End Point
Keeping in mind that "a core purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was
to do away with all governmentally imposed discrimination based on race,"
the Court determined that "race-conscious admissions policies must be li-
mited in time." 194 The Court found that "sunset provisions" and "periodic
reviews" to determine the continuing necessity of the program could meet
the requirement of a reasonable end point in the context of higher educa-
tion.195 These approaches to satisfying the durational limit requirement
could be implemented whether the admissions policy was race- or gender-
conscious. Perhaps a university would determine that a reasonable ending
oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other innocent persons competing for
the benefit.' To be narrowly tailored, a race-conscious admissions program must not 'unduly burden
individuals who are not members of the favored racial and ethnic groups."' (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S.
at 308; Metro Broad., Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 630 (1990) (O'Connor, J., dissenting))).
192. Id. ("As Justice Powell recognized in Bakke, so long as a race-conscious admissions program
uses race as a 'plus' factor in the context of individualized consideration, a rejected applicant 'will
not have been foreclosed from all consideration for that seat simply because he was not the right
color or had the wrong surname.... His qualifications would have been weighed fairly and competi-
tively, and he would have no basis to complain of unequal treatment under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment."' (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 318)).
193. Examples of factors the Court could consider in determining the extent of the burden on
women are as follows: whether the women who were not admitted were forced to attend lower-
ranked institutions, whether the women received less financial aid than they otherwise would have,
and how many women are affected by the policy.
194. Id. at 341-42 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432 (1984)) ("This requirement re-
flects that racial classifications, however compelling their goals, are potentially so dangerous that
they may be employed no more broadly than the interest demands. Enshrining a permanent justifica-
tion for racial preferences would offend this fundamental equal protection principle. We see no rea-
son to exempt race-conscious admissions programs from the requirement that all governmental use
of race must have a logical end point.").
195. Id. at 342.
373
point is when the gender balance approaches 50/50 again, but it may ulti-
mately be up to the Court to make that call.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that the Grutter factors were applied as part of a strict
scrutiny analysis, these factors are separable from the strict scrutiny standard
and could be applied in a flexible way to accommodate whatever standard of
review the Court chooses to apply. 196 The use of the Grutter factors would
not result in gender-conscious policies being per se unconstitutional, but it
might help to ensure that qualified female applicants receive the considera-
tion they deserve in the university admissions process. And instead of per-
petuating outdated stereotypes, it would give credence to the fact that, while
there may be inherent immutable differences between genders, these differ-
ences lose significance in the context of public higher education. 197 In a per-
fect world, "[t]he way to stop discrimination on the basis of [sex] is to stop
discriminating on the basis of [sex]," 198 but until that world becomes a reali-
ty, a solid framework established by the Court to guide universities as they
devise their admissions policies may be a good way to help stop discrimina-
tion on the basis of any classification.
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196. See supra Part IV.B.2.
197. See supra notes 153, 155.
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